I am trying to really understand friendship (4)

 

“A natural disposition of character to guide our choices and actions towards the right course”. This is the way Aristotle defines virtue. In this definition, there is no explanation for the origin of virtue, for what causes it, for what it is (or would be) a product or a consequence of. However, contrary to what we might be tempted to think, omitting or delaying an explanation for the origin of virtue does not mean that it is a mere whim of nature, and that it therefore occurs randomly in the spirit of some people and not others. In other words, Aristotle doesn’t provide us with any principle that causes virtue, but because it is advantageous in its effects, he provides the means by which virtue manifests itself and grows, until it becomes a true “wisdom of life”, seemingly  its most important result.

 

These means for the emergence and growth of virtue are well identified in the Nicomachean Ethics: it is about the importance of receiving an education in virtue, of being trained in it by the influence of other virtuous human beings, of knowing how to recognize virtue in others and choosing them as an example, and of creating a habit towards virtue by practicing virtuous acts.

 

The characterization of friendship as being sustained by virtue leaves us with several topics to discuss. One of them is this: does friendship arise spontaneously, on its own, as an effusion of virtue itself, provided that the human beings involved are virtuous? And this question leads us to the topic of the origin, not of virtue, but of friendship itself.

 

The co-presence of virtue, that is, the relationship between virtuous, good, respectful, loyal people with a sense and concern for the common good, etc., must necessarily produce something good and positive. Therefore, the encounter between virtuous beings should make the presence of virtue evident and thereby sustain the development of a good relationship and a fruitful debate on the paths to wisdom, or how best to govern the city, among other things.

 

But the relationship between virtuous beings does not necessarily translate into friendship. This must therefore be founded and originate in something more than virtue. There would be an excessive and inappropriate proliferation of friendships (remembering that “true” friendship only exists when founded on virtue) if this were the case. And that friendship does not follow solely and by itself from an encounter of virtues is even clearer when one accepts that friendship is rare and therefore precious.

 

Aristotle does not go so far as to confess, as far as we know from the writings available, that friendship requires more than intentionality, more than an intention for good, for wisdom, for virtue. Its “other” origin must therefore lie in the realm of feelings, of the needs we have, of character inclinations, of the subtleties of humor, in the way we find a key in the words and gestures of others to the doors of our inner world.

 

Moreover, if this is the case, it is possible to untie the knot that Aristotle creates on the subject of friendship. It is no coincidence that, two thousand five hundred years after Aristotle’s writings, we continue to study and debate them. In the case of friendship, Aristotle lacks the conciseness and clarity that my mind needs. And I want to understand friendship, first and foremost, from the point of view of philosophy and concept, before admitting that it cannot be explained in these terms.

 

And so I can make explicit the reflection that motivated me to write this fourth text on the subject: that friendship can arise, grow, and be felt between wrongdoers. I don’t think it is necessary to explain too much. It is possible to observe feelings of companionship, attitudes that foster bonds of friendship and solidarity between people who are not guided by Aristotelian values of virtue. This does no harm to friendship, in what I believe it to be, but it does harm Aristotle’s theory. Making virtue, as Aristotle defines it, a condition for friendship contradicts the feeling that arises and develops independently of our attention and predisposition to virtue.